Can J Psychiatry. 2009;54 (7): 427-428. P sychiatry is caught between the Scylla of suggestion and the Charybdis of biology. While serious mental disorders are brain-driven-in the sense that they have a neurobiology-culture affects how the mind registers these signals from the brain. That means suggestion. Any component the culture imposes represents suggestion. The culture suggests us into various ways of making concrete and interpretable the neurochemical impulses we receive from the brain.
This tension between suggestion and biology has some interesting clinical consequences. Many diagnoses that once seemed as valid and reliable as mumps turn out to be puffs of smoke. Hysteria, old maid's insanity, and multiple personality disorder immediately come to mind. Their symptoms are those of suggestion, and as the culture changes, the symptoms follow suit. The fainting female of 19th-century hysteria has vanished as the snows of yesteryear. 1 Thus there are disorders psychiatry has believed to be real that have turned out to be unreal.
Conversely, some disorders that psychiatry has believed to be unreal have turned out to be real. There are diagnoses that psychiatry attributes to suggestion-and medical anthropologists consider culture-bound-that turn out to have a neurobiology of their own. For example, Spence et al 2 have shown with neuroimaging that brain activity in simulation and a patient's genuine conviction of having a paralyzed limb differ strikingly.
In this issue, we consider both phenomena: supposedly real diagnoses that turn out to have a large amount of cultural shaping, as manifest in historical changes in patterns of anxiety, and supposedly epiphenomenal symptoms such as catatonia that turn out to be real indeed. In the first In Review paper, Dr Ian R Dowbiggin, 3 professor of history at the University of Prince Edward Island and a specialist in the history of paranoia and anxiety, 4 tells us about the cultural shaping of anxiety. "In the early 21st century, why were people reporting higher levels of anxiety than ever before?" 3, p 431 asks Dr Dowbiggin. The answer concerns such nonclinical circumstances as third-party reimbursement and veterans' politics. In the second In Review paper, Dr Max Fink, 5 emeritus professor of psychiatry at the State University of New York at Stony Brook and coauthor of a recent study of catatonia, 6 argues that catatonia is not merely-as commonly believed-an unusual manifestation of schizophrenia that historically has been on the decline. Rather, catatonia is a profoundly organic phenomenon that should be considered a separate syndrome of its own, a disease sui generis, says Dr Fink. Indeed, catatonia must possess some strong biological component because it responds well to electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) and to treatment with benzodiazepines, especially lorazepam. (Hysteria does not respond to ECT.)
We thought it was real but it turned out it was not. We thought it unreal but it turned out to be real. This tension runs throughout the history of psychiatry. Seldom is it seen as clearly as in so-called psychosomatic illnesses, or in breakdowns of the mind-body relationship, where cultural templates help give patients images of what real illness represents and what counts as Madame, it's all in your head. 7 Most patients would prefer the former, if only to be taken more seriously.
In the world of psychosomaticity, phantom paralyses were once not uncommon. Young women would experience an emotional shock of some kind and shortly thereafter find themselves unable to walk, or perhaps able to move their legs The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry There was a clear cultural template for the so-called sofa cases of the late 19th-century, upper-middle-class women in the big cities of the Atlantic community who would take to their beds and remain there for months or even years. Such behaviour is possible only in households with servants, and in a society in which women, enveloped in corsets and hoopskirts, are unable to move a good deal anyway. Henry James' sister, Alice, was a classic sofa case. 9 Soon after the First World War, the sofa cases go away, vanquished by the flapper in her short black Chanel skirt, who plays tennis, suntans, and smokes in public. For the flapper, being a sofa case was simply not on, as one cultural image of femininity gave way to another.
At the time, each presentation of psychosomatic illness seemed as real to the clinicians of the day as mumps. Lacking hindsight, they assumed such conditions had always existed and were biological givens. In the retrospect of history, we see there are symptoms that come and go as the tides. Thus what we have always believed to be real-such as female hysteria -often turns out to be a handful of vapour.
Does history offer us the example of other catatonias as well-illnesses thought to be evanescent but that turn out to have an underlying biology-or real caseness-of their own? German psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin, the founder of modern psychiatric classification, was heavily criticized in his day for manic-depressive illness (MDI), a construct deemed far too global to be real. 10 Nonetheless, history has suggested that Kraepelin was right. By MDI, Kraepelin meant all mood disorders, all mania and all depressive illness together, whatever the polarity. This makes a good deal of sense. (The people with depressive illness Kraepelin saw were mainly melancholics in asylums-hence he considered the depression of MDI to be a unitary illness; however, he did admit to a second kind of psychogenic depression that was not part of MDI.) Subsequent attempts to disaggregate MDI have not been entirely happy. The facile separation today of people considered to have bipolar disorders from those considered to have unipolar disorders, as though these were as different as chalk and cheese, has evoked growing uneasiness. Is bipolar depression really so different from the unipolar sort? 11 Maybe Kraepelin 10 was right after all, plugging, in his systematic, Germanic way, into a deep stream of real melancholic illness as old as time.
These reflections command modesty from all: from medical anthropologists who believe that culture trumps Nature, from psychiatrists who believe symptom pictures to be endlessly malleable depending on the social construction of illness, and from clinicians in the trenches who believe that what they are seeing clinically represents a real underlying disease process rather than an artifact of suggestion. In approaching the history of psychiatry, modesty is the watchword.
